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Multinational Corporate Liability Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act:
Some Structural Concerns
BY MICHAEL D. RAMSEY*
As a general proposition, courts should apply duly enacted
statutes to cases brought before them, even where the facts of those
cases lie far beyond the drafters' contemplations and the resolution of
a case may lead the court into difficult and controversial exercises of
judgment.' Nonetheless, I argue below that courts should be hesitant
in adopting an expansive view of multinational corporate liability
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), as they have been invited
to do in recent cases.3 ATCA litigation in this context often amounts
to U.S. courts making foreign policy on the basis of very thin
statutory authorization, and pressing that role upon the courts is in
substantial tension with conventional wisdom in at least three other
aspects of U.S. law. This is particularly troublesome because, as I
argue below, the conventional wisdom in these other areas is
accepted, and indeed in some cases necessarily embraced by,
advocates of an expansive ATCA. As a result, the argument for
expansive application of the ATCA in this area rests upon
problematic foundations.
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D., Stanford
University Law School, 1989; A.B., Dartmouth College, 1986.
1. See Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "International Comity," 83 IowA L. REv.
893 (1998) (criticizing the doctrine of international comity on this ground)
[hereinafter International Comity]; see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl.
Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400,409 (1990) ("Courts in the United States have the
power, and ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases and controversies properly
presented to them.").
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001).
3. E.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
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I. Judicial Stretches Required to Accommodate Corporate
ATCA Claims
I begin with the proposition that corporate liability under the
ATCA requires a series of judicial stretches.4 Consider one of the
leading corporate ATCA cases currently in litigation, Wiwa v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.5 That case involves a suit by Nigerian citizens
against various related British and Dutch companies for injuries and
deaths suffered at the hands of the Nigerian government in Nigeria;
the corporations purportedly knew of and benefited from the
Nigerian government's actions against the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs'
decedents, although they had not participated directly.6 To bring this
case within the purview of U.S. courts, a number of aggressive judicial
moves are required. I will give a few quick examples, although others
are available.
First, one must say that the relevant statute, the ATCA,
encompasses such a claim. The ATCA is a brief and generally
worded law, stating that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations.. . ,7 There is not much agreement on
the scope of the statute. Passed in 1789 in the original judiciary act,' it
was applied only rarely until 1980,' and not applied against corporate
defendants for almost another twenty years."° The original point of
the statute has been much debated, but in any event it seems quite
4. I do not mean to suggest that it is only corporate ATCA claims that raise
troubling questions. Some non-corporate claims, especially those involving neither
U.S. parties nor acts occurring in the United States, are similarly problematic. But as
I illustrate below, corporate claims carry some additional difficulties.
5. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 92-94.
6. Id.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
8. On the origins of the ATCA, see William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of
the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 221 (1996); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act
of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989); Anthony D'Amato, The
Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1988);
William Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986).
9. Filartiga v. Petia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
10. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
11. Seesupra note 8.
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clear that its drafters did not have in mind suits against foreign
corporations for acts occurring outside the United States.
Second, one must say that the ATCA provides a cause of action
as well as conveying jurisdiction. This is a little problematic, as the
cause of action requirement did not enter U.S. jurisprudence until the
mid-nineteenth century, after the ATCA was passed. It is much
debated whether this series of events means that a cause of action
should or should not be engrafted onto the ATCA.'2
Third, one must say that the ATCA's grant of federal jurisdiction
is constitutional. Article III of the Constitution does not provide
jurisdiction over suits between aliens, 3 so the only way alien-against-
alien ATCA suits such as Wiwa could be constitutional is if a federal
question is involved. 4 It is argued that because international law "is
part of our law," in the famous phrase of a number of court opinions,
international law is incorporated into federal common law and thus
the ATCA cases are in fact premised upon federal common law.5
But the international-law-as-federal-common-law proposition is itself
heatedly contested 6 and seems in substantial tension with several
12- Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) [hereinafter
Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy]; Curtis A. Bradley, Customary
International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 421 (2000).
13. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
14. Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 12; Michael D.
Ramsey, International Law as Part of Our Law: A Constitutional Perspective, -
PEPP. L. Rnv. __ (forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter International Law as Part of Our
Law]. Obviously the jurisdictional issue would not arise where another basis of
federal jurisdiction, such as diversity, is present. It is, therefore, primarily a concern
in alien-against-alien ATCA suits. Cf Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (ATCA suit based on diversity where defendant was U.S. corporation).
15. E.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see Louis Henkin,
International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1561 (1984)
[hereinafter Henkin, International Law]; Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. RaV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land:
Customary International Law as Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. RaV. 393
(1997).
16. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815
(1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law]; A.M.
Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(1995); Phillip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REv. 665 (1986).
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older decisions of the Supreme Court."
Fourth, one must find a way around the "act of state" doctrine,
the long-standing common law rule that courts of one country "will
not sit in judgment upon the acts of another done within its own
territory."' 8 As a general matter, that rule applies in cases between
two private litigants, where one party asserts as part of its case that a
foreign government has acted wrongfully. 9 Given an ordinary
reading, the act of state rule would thus seem to preclude cases such
as Wiwa, for the plaintiffs' case there depends upon a showing that
the Nigerian government acted wrongfully within Nigeria.
Fifth, one must establish that international law in fact provides
for corporate liability for international crimes committed by a
government, where the corporation may have known of and/or
benefited from these crimes but did not directly participate in them.
That is a debated proposition of international law for which there is
relatively little precedent in the customary practices of nations.'
I do not argue here that all, or indeed any, of these matters
provide a conclusive rejection of ATCA litigation, and indeed in
other contexts I have suggested that some of them have been
interpreted too broadly." However, the sheer number of
controverted points upon which corporate ATCA litigation rests may
suggest that expansive application of ATCA liability is a project
requiring much judicial sympathy for its success.
H. Foreign Policy and the Expansive View of ATCA Litigation
The second part of my claim is that corporate ATCA litigation is
likely to involve the courts in substantial questions of foreign policy.
17. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436,444 (1886); City of San Francisco v. Scott, 111
U.S. 768, 769 (1884); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286-87 (1875).
18. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see generally Joseph
Dellapenna, Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine, 35 VILL. L. REv. 1 (1990).
19. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). The act of state
doctrine also applies in suits directly against a foreign sovereign or its agents, see
Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252, although foreign sovereign immunity makes such an
application less likely, at least outside commercial contexts.
20. See, e.g., Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity
in Human Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 339 (2001) (this
volume).
21. See Ramsey, International Law as Part of Our Law, supra note 14 (suggesting
an Article III jurisdictional basis for ATCA litigation); Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of
State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1998) (arguing for
narrowing the scope of the act of state doctrine in some contexts).
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It has been easy to understate the foreign affairs challenges
encompassed by ATCA litigation because to date most high-profile
ATCA cases have involved either low-profile incidents in minor
countries,= or outcomes that were not seriously contested by either
the world community or the political branches of the U.S.
government.' The Wiwa case, and a few others recently filed, may be
the beginning of cases that edge more evidently into foreign policy
conflict.' But it is easy to imagine cases of higher profile and greater
controversy. Consider three examples:
1) A claim against Israel for violation of the alleged international
right of displaced Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in
Israel, ' brought while the existence or non-existence of that right
is a critical bargaining point in the Mideast peace talks, and while
the United States is attempting to use its special relationship with
Israel to achieve a delicate diplomatic resolution of those talks;
2) A claim against Britain for violation of an alleged international
rule against imperialism and colonialism, premised upon
Britain's occupation of Northern Ireland, brought in the context
of the close United States-Britain partnership in both economic
and diplomatic matters;
3) A claim against China for various alleged abuses of international
human or environmental rights connected with Chinese
industrial development, brought at a time when the U.S.
government has settled upon a policy of encouraging China's
rapid modernization and economic development through the
promotion of U.S. investment in China.
Further, to the extent corporate liability may be premised upon
knowledge of or benefit from the wrongful activities of foreign
22. E.g., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (Paraguay); Abebe-
Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (Ethiopia); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.
Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (Burma).
23. E.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d
493 (9th Cir. 1992); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
24. Elizabeth Amon, Alien Tort Claims Act Provides a Legal Forum for the
World, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23,2000, at Al.
25. See John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a Right of Return, 39 HARv.
INT'LL.J. 171 (1998).
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governments, it is easy to see how all of these hypotheticals could
become real cases of corporate ATCA liability in U.S. courts.
Indeed, corporate liability greatly expands the practical sweep of
ATCA litigation, as it is less likely to be limited by practical questions
of personal jurisdiction: multinational corporations are more likely to
be "present" in the United States for personal jurisdiction purposes
than are individual perpetrators.
I1. Factors Counseling Against Court-Driven Foreign Policy
As set forth above, I think it fair to describe expansive ATCA
litigation, especially as applied to multinational corporations, as
involving a series of judicial stretches to produce a legal regime in
which courts would become deeply involved in U.S. foreign policy.26
That alone is not reason to reject ATCA litigation, for as I and others
have argued, simply because a case raises foreign policy issues is not
necessarily grounds for a court to refuse to decide it.27 However, at
least three strands of U.S. law strongly counsel caution in this area:
the policy underlying the Supreme Court's view of the act of state
doctrine, as reflected in its decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino;' the concerns about jurisdiction over extraterritorial
disputes, as reflected for example in the recent controversy over the
Helms-Burton legislation;" and the concerns over foreign policy
made at the state and local level, as reflected for example in the
recent attempts by the state of Massachusetts, among others, to
impose sanctions on companies doing business in Burma.'
Particularly problematic for an expansive view of the ATCA is
the fact that many of the ATCA's leading defenders have endorsed
the conventional view in each of these areas. Leading ATCA
defenders do not, for example, quarrel with the Sabbatino case; to the
contrary, they rely upon its implications to justify federal jurisdiction
26. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiffs Diplomacy, Foreign Aff.,
Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 102.
27. Ramsey, International Comity, supra note 1; Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal
Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997).
28. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
29. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091) (providing a
cause of action for former owners of property nationalized by the Castro regime in
Cuba against private parties "trafficking" in such property).
30. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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in ATCA cases." Leading ATCA defenders have expressed
reservations about state and local foreign policy activity;32 and leading
ATCA defenders, together with most of the international law
community, joined in expressing concerns about the extraterritorial
overreaching of the Helms-Burton legislation.3 Yet, in each case the
underlying policy is difficult to square with an expansive view of the
ATCA.
A. The Problem of Sabbatino
Consider Sabbatino first. That case involved a claim that the
government of Cuba had wrongfully expropriated certain property,
and thus that Banco Nacional's attempt, on behalf of Cuba, to collect
money owed on account of the sale of that property, should not be
permitted?' The Court held this argument barred by the act of state
doctrine, because the argument would entail the Court passing
judgment upon Cuba's act of expropriation. In so doing, the Court
strongly rested its decision upon the view that foreign policy was best
left to the political branches of government, and indeed that this
attitude of judicial restraint, while not mandated by the Constitution,
had "constitutional underpinnings" in the idea of separation of
powers. 5
As discussed above, Sabbatino's specific holding as to the act of
state doctrine is problematic for ATCA litigation, because most
ATCA litigation-like Sabbatino-involves a judgment as to the
wrongfulness of a foreign governmental act?6  Accordingly,
31. Infra Part III.A.
32. Infra Part III.C.
33. Infra Part III.B.
34. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-25.
35. Id. at 423-25. The Court further stated:
The act of state doctrine... arises out of the basic relationships between
branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the
competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular
kinds of decisions in the area of international relations. The doctrine as
formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere.
Id.; see also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 137-40 (2d ed.
1996) (discussing foreign affairs concerns in Sabbatino) [hereinafter HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS].
36. The Wiwa case, for example, turns upon holding the acts of the Nigerian
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proponents of ATCA litigation have generally called for a narrow
view of Sabbatino, arguing for a series of exceptions and
qualifications that would largely confine Sabbatino to its facts.37
However, if the policy motivations of Sabbatino are to be taken
seriously, Sabbatino is not so easily limited, for it should be apparent
that much ATCA litigation may involve courts in the troublesome
areas of foreign policy that Sabbatino said courts should try to avoid.'
ATCA proponents might be on stronger ground here if they took
the position that Sabbatino was a fundamentally misguided opinion.39
But in an ironic twist, ATCA proponents rely on Sabbatino to
support one of the crucial elements of the ATCA. Sabbatino applied
the act of state doctrine as a matter of federal common law, binding
upon the states and presumably a sufficient basis for federal
jurisdiction." It is therefore the critical case-and indeed the only
Supreme Court case-endorsing the power of the federal courts to
make federal common law in foreign affairs.4 ' As discussed above,
the power of the federal courts to make federal common law in
foreign affairs is critical to the constitutionality of the ATCA, for this
is how alien-against-alien ATCA claims become a federal question
government wrongful under international law. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88, 92-94 (2d Cir. 2000).
37. Filartiga v. Peija-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a Paraguayan
policeman's torture of a political detainee, although done under color of official
authority, was not an act of state because it had not been specifically authorized by
the government); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding
that Sabbatino did not extend to violations of clearly established international law,
based on Sabbatino's statement that it was considering the scope of the act of state
doctrine only "in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles") (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428).
38. The Supreme Court has specifically said that Sabbatino cannot be read as
authorizing judicial nondecision in cases involving foreign affairs even where an act
of state is not challenged, and thus has rejected the broadest reading of Sabbatino.
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400,404 (1990). But
it seems peculiar to read Sabbatino not to apply to matters that are undoubtedly acts
of state (as conventionally defined) and which plainly implicate its underlying policy.
39. Some leading human rights scholars do take this position. See Michael J.
Bayzler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1986).
40. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 378 ("[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an
issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and functions of the
Judiciary and the national Executive in ordering our relationships with other
members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law."); HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 35, at 138-41.
41. See Henkin, International Law, supra note 15 (relying on Sabbatino to
support federal jurisdiction over international human rights cases); Bradley &
Goldsmith, Customary International Law, supra note 16 (discussing the importance
of Sabbatino to international human rights litigation).
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subject to federal jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution 2
As a result, Sabbatino plays a central role in the case for an expansive
ATCA .
It strikes me that this places ATCA proponents on
uncomfortable ground. On one hand, they must argue for the
fundamental validity of Sabbatino, else the jurisdictional ground for
alien-against-alien ATCA cases is called seriously into question. On
the other hand they must read Sabbatino narrowly in terms of its
application, else it would bar adjudication of most ATCA cases on act
of state grounds. But the narrow reading does violence to Sabbatino's
motivating policy-namely, to limit court involvement in foreign
affairs.' And indeed, ATCA proponents must reject that entire
policy, not only to defend a restrictive reading of Sabbatino, but
because that policy would call into question the entire ATCA
enterprise. Yet that policy-the limitation of court involvement in
foreign affairs-is what justified the Sabbatino Court making federal
common law in the first place.
Proponents of ATCA litigation cannot have it both ways. Either
Sabbatino is right, and concerns over judicial involvement with
foreign affairs justify the creation of a federal common law of foreign
affairs (in which case caution is appropriate in ATCA cases); or else
Sabbatino is wrong, and court-driven foreign policy is unproblematic
(in which case the jurisdictional basis of the ATCA is that much more
doubtful). My own position is intermediate. I find it problematic for
courts to refuse to decide cases properly before them, simply because
they fear foreign policy implications. Therefore, to the extent
Sabbatino purported to find a rule of law that required judicial
abstention, I find it troublesome, and I would reject subsequent lower
court cases that extended Sabbatino to allow (or require) judicial
abstention wherever foreign policy concerns are raised." On the
42. Supra Part I.
43. For arguments directly tying ATCA jurisdiction to Sabbatino, see Harold
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1824 (1998);
Gerald Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 371 (1997);
Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law
After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 393 (1997).
44. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423-25.
45. E.g., Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir.
1997); Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Co., 965 F. Supp. 899 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd
113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); see Goldsmith, supra note 27 (criticizing these
decisions).
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other hand, I think the Sabbatino Court was correct that courts
should be wary of involving themselves in foreign affairs
controversies, and in cases of ambiguity they should not stretch
statutes to authorize such activity.
46
B. The Problem of Extraterritoriality and Helms-Burton
A second difficulty for an expansive view of the ATCA is the
international community's general concern over extraterritorial
legislation. In many (though not all) cases, the expansive view of the
ATCA woul d extend its reach to acts occurring entirely outside the
United States, and often to claims-such as Wiwa-that involve no
U.S. parties. In other contexts, the United States' purported
assertion of legislative jurisdiction over events having no connection
to it is viewed with doctrinal suspicion and political outrage. Yet in
the ATCA context the doctrine is ignored and the outrage is not
forthcoming, without explanation.
As to the doctrine, the first aspect of the problem arises from
cases exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(ARAMCO), which states that acts of Congress will not be read to
have extraterritorial effect unless Congress manifests a contrary
intent.' The basis, the Court has said, is that Congress is ordinarily
concerned with matters occurring within the United States,49 so even
46. Ramsey, International Comity, supra note 1 (describing the act of state
doctrine, as applied to federal law, as a rule of interpretation limiting the scope of
ambiguous or generally worded statutes). Thus I think it perfectly appropriate for
courts to apply statutes such as the Torture Victim Protection Act, which contains a
clear directive by Congress for courts to take up foreign affairs matters. Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). By contrast,
I find the stretches necessary for much ATCA litigation to be problematic, for the
reasons stated in Sabbatino.
47. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92-94 (2d Cir. 2000). This
would also include, for example, the Filartiga, Kadic, and Marcos litigations.
48. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244 (1991); see also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949) (noting "legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States"); Blackmer v.
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (same); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S.
94, 98 (1922) (stating that if laws are to apply "outside of the strict territorial
jurisdiction [of the United States], it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute,
and failure to do so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard").
49. Foley, 336 U.S. at 285 (noting rule "based on the assumption that Congress is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions"); William S. Dodge, Understanding
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 117-18 (1998)
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though Congress typically legislates in general terms ("'x' shall be
prohibited"), such general terms should not be construed to apply to
the entire world (as "'x' shall be prohibited everywhere on the
planet") but rather should be construed to apply only territorially (as
"'x' shall be prohibited within the territory of the United States") 50
Applied to the ATCA, this rule would seem to present
difficulties for an expansive view. The ATCA is, like the statute in
ARAMCO and similar cases, generally worded, with nothing in its
language suggesting an intent for it to apply to acts occurring
overseas. Further, the enacting Congress plainly had concern over
violations of the law of nations occurring in the United States.
During the period of the Articles of Confederation immediately
preceding passage of the ATCA, substantial concern was raised about
the U.S. government's inability to police against violations of the law
of nations occurring in the United States (including, for example,
unwarranted seizures of foreign ships and assaults on diplomatic
personnel).5 ' In contrast, there is no record of concern about
enforcement of the law of nations abroad in the time leading up to
passage of the act. Applying the ARAMCO presumption would seem
to suggest a territorial limitation to ATCA claims. 2
Even if one were inclined to reject the ARAMCO limitation,53 a
[hereinafter Understanding the Presumption]; see also Smith v. United States, 507
U.S. 197,203-04 (1993) (applying ARAMCO).
50. Ramsey, International Comity, supra note 1, at 910-11 (expanding on this
point). For commentary and criticism of ARAMCO, see Dodge, Understanding the
Presumption, supra note 49; Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights
in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 510-19 (1997); Gary B. Born, A
Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus.
1 (1992); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American
Law, 1991 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 179.
51. Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power,
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 420-22 (2000) [hereinafter Myth of Extraconstitutional
Foreign Affairs Power]. Specific events giving rise to concern included an assault on
the French consul general in Philadelphia and seizures of foreign ships in
Massachusetts and South Carolina. Id.
52. John Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals 'Violate'
International Law, 21 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 47, 55 (1988) (suggesting a territorial
limitation based on congressional intent). But see 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795)
(contemplating application of ATCA to act of U.S. citizen in Africa).
53. ARAMCO has been criticized by international scholars. See, e.g., Born, supra
note 50, at 61-95. Further, it might be argued that the ATCA does not apply U.S. law
abroad (the vice of ARAMCO), but merely authorizes U.S. courts to apply
international law. As to the first point, the presumption is well-established in U.S.
law, however unpopular it is with scholars. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption,
supra note 49, at 87. The second point is subject to two objections. First, the
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further doctrinal concern is the jurisdictional limit imposed by
customary international law. In general, international practice
recognizes the ability of nations to regulate with respect to acts
occurring in or affecting their own territory, and with respect to
extraterritorial acts of their own citizens.' Beyond this, international
practice accepts only limited exercises of a nation's jurisdiction. For
example, there has long been recognized a category of "universal"
crimes (such as piracy) over which all nations have jurisdiction,
regardless of where they occur." But the offenses included within this
category are limited to the most heinous acts that render the
perpetrator an "enemy of all mankind"; they do not include all
deviations from international law. 6  Thus, it is a principle of
international law that nations generally may not extend their laws to
cover events in foreign countries not affecting their citizens or their
territory, even where those events themselves violate international
law. 7
mechanics of ATCA claims essentially require one to view the ATCA as
incorporating international law into U.S. law. Otherwise, it is difficult to see the
constitutional basis of jurisdiction (which in most cases depends upon there being a
federal question). See supra Part I. Further, depending on what one thinks of the
cause of action requirement, it seems necessary to construe the Act to provide a
cause of action, which is also a matter of U.S. law. Thus is it more accurate to say
that ATCA courts apply U.S. law, although that law incorporates international law.
Second, it is not clear why the ARAMCO presumption should be limited to U.S. law.
The presumption rests upon the interpretive view that Congress is primarily
concerned with acts occurring in the United States. That would be a basis for
construing an act of Congress not to apply to events occurring outside the United
States, even if the act in question directed courts to apply a law other than U.S. law.
54. MARK JANIS, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 322-30 (2d ed. 1996).
55. Id. at 329-30; Rogers, supra note 52, at 50-53. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,
776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985).
56. Rogers, supra note 52, at 50-52. For example, an assault on a diplomat is a
longstanding violation of international law. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1
Dall.) 111 (Pa. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1784) (punishing an assault upon a French
diplomat in Philadelphia, a violation of international law). One would not contend,
however, that a simple assault, such as committed by De Longchamps, was a
universal crime rendering the perpetrator subject to the jurisdiction of every nation
on earth.
57. Accordingly, in the De Longchamps case, a nation having no connection to
the diplomatic assault would itself violate international law (the international law of
jurisdiction) if it applied its law to De Longchamps, even though De Longchamps' act
created a violation of international law. This objection is not circumvented by the
claim that U.S. courts in ATCA litigation are applying international law rather than
U.S. law. Cf supra note 53. The point of so-called universal jurisdiction is that only
the most extreme international law violations-and not others-are subject to
jurisdiction in countries having no connection with the violation. JANIS, supra note
54, at 329.
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That limitation is doctrinally problematic for ATCA litigation
because another interpretive presumption declares that acts of
Congress will not be construed to violate customary international law,
unless there is a manifest intent to do so." Accordingly, the ATCA
should not be construed to extend the reach of U.S. law beyond
international customary limits. This would not implicate all
extraterritorial applications of the ATCA. It would not, for example,
pose a problem for suits against U.S. corporations59 or suits premised
upon acts subject to universal jurisdiction." But many ATCA claims
would be rendered problematic. The Wiwa case, for example, does
not involve U.S. defendants (or, for that matter, U.S. plaintiffs), and
thus nationality could not be a basis for U.S. actions.6' Further, it
does not seem that Wiwa involves an offense subject to universal
jurisdiction. It may or may not be that the underlying offenses of the
Nigerian government were universal crimes.2 Even if they were, the
passive participation of the defendant corporation seems to fall short
of making the corporation an "enemy of all mankind"-indeed, as
mentioned above, there is some question as to whether it is even a
violation of international law at all, much less a violation of the most
heinous and universal variety.'
More striking than the doctrinal issues, however, is the
unrelenting hostility shown by the international academic community
to U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in other contexts.
Consider, for example, the response to the "Helms-Burton"
legislation, enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1996. This law, among
other things, provided a civil cause of action in U.S. courts against
corporations that "trafficked" in property confiscated by the Cuban
58. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S: (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (noting
"an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains"); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International
Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103 (1990);
Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEo. L.J. 479 (1998); Ramsey,
International Comity, supra note 1, at 916-31.
59. E.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). As to these
suits, international law would recognize jurisdiction based on nationality. JANIS,
supra note 54, at 324-25.
60. JANIS, supra note 54, at 329. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Filartiga's
Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM
L. REv. 463 (1997) (suggesting this limitation).
61. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2000).
62- Id. at 91-93 (discussing crimes alleged).
63. See Clapham & Jerbi, supra note 20.
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government after the Castro revolution.6' Since the United States had
long had an embargo on trade and investment in Cuba by U.S.
companies, it was clear that the targets of this legislation were non-
U.S. entities, and that liability was to be based on activities occurring
entirely abroad."
Helms-Burton produced an explosion of criticism among the
international community both in the United States and abroad.'6 The
principal argument deployed against it was that the United States was
exercising jurisdiction upon matters that did not concern it-that is,
upon acts done outside its territory by non-U.S. parties not subject to
universal jurisdiction.67 To the contention that the U.S. was merely
attempting to enforce an international norm against expropriation
allegedly violated by the Cuban government,6 it was pointed out that
not all violations of international law gave rise to extraterritorial
jurisdiction-only "universal" crimes, which did not include
expropriation.69
This deeply-felt criticism of Helms-Burton is difficult to square
with the international law community's enthusiasm for an expansive
64. Officially, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110. Stat. 785, popularly called after its chief sponsors,
Rep. Dan Burton and Sen. Jesse Helms [hereinafter Helms-Burton]. The civil
liability portion of the act, Title III, contains a provision allowing the President to
suspend the ability to bring suit based on trafficking in confiscated property, and the
President has exercised this suspension, such that the liability provisions have never
actually been in effect.
65. On Helms-Burton generally, see William S. Dodge, The Helms-Burton Act
and Transnational Legal Process, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 713 (1997)
[hereinafter Helms-Burton Act]; John C. Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign
Policy: The Case of the Helms-Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 747
(1997); Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law, 31 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1 (1997); Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internationalization and U.S. Economic
Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 58-64 (2001).
66. See Dodge, Helms-Burton Act, supra note 65, at 713 n.2 (listing sources);
Cleveland, supra note 65, at 60-61 & nn.352, 353.
67. E.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 422 (1996) (concluding that Helms-Burton violates customary
rules of jurisdiction); Cleveland, supra note 65, at 61, 64 (same, noting difficulties
with "unilateral extraterritorial measures to promote human rights values"). But see
Brice M. Clagett, The Controversy over Title III of the Helms-Burton Act: Who is
Breaking International Law - the United States, or the States that Have Made
Themselves Co-Conspirators with Cuba in its Unlawful Confiscations?, 30 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 271, 277 (1997) (concluding that Helms-Burton is
consistent with international law) [hereinafter Who is Breaking International Law].
68. Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent with
International Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 434 (1996) (making this point).
69. Lowenfeld, supra note 67, at 422.
[Vol. 24:361
2001] Multinational Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act 375
view of the ATCA. The claims presented in Wiwa, for example, seem
to resemble closely the claims that would be permitted by Title III of
Helms-Burton. In both cases the argument is that a corporation
investing and operating in a foreign country knew of and benefited
from violations of international law by that country.7' Indeed, it
seems that the claims parallel to those authorized by Helms-Burton
could, under an expansive view of the ATCA, be brought as ATCA
claims.7' The only question, for an advocate of expansive ATCA
claims, would be whether corporate complicity in the alleged
violation by Cuba was itself an international law violation-which is
precisely the international law question in Wiwa.
In short, it is difficult to explain the international law
community's enthusiasm for an expansive ATCA coupled with its
distaste for Helms-Burton.' Rather, the serious concerns expressed
in reaction to the extraterritorial overreach of Helms-Burton should
apply with equal force to an expansive reading of the ATCA.
70. Clagett, Who Is Breaking International Law, supra note 67, at 277 (describing
Helms-Burton in this manner); see also Cleveland, supra note 65, at 64
(acknowledging the potential for this analogy but ultimately rejecting it without much
explanation). The principal factual distinction would seem to be that in Wiwa, the
corporation began operations in the country prior to the alleged violations whereas in
the Helms-Burton pattern, the investor would have arrived on the scene after the
alleged violation. It is not clear, however, that this makes Wiwa a better case for
liability.
71. The principal difference is that the ATCA authorizes only claims by aliens,
whereas Helms-Burton authorizes only claims by U.S. citizens. This is hardly a
reason to prefer the ATCA as a basis for suit, since ATCA claims based on Cuban
expropriations would have even less connection with the United States.
72. One would not wish to reach the conclusion that the difference turns on the
type of injury asserted, that is, that the international law community is more
sympathetic to claims by victims of crimes against persons than it is to claims of
crimes against property.
Again, my own position is an intermediate one. While I think Helms-Burton did
represent a jurisdictional overreach on the part of Congress, in terms of customary
international law, that does not empower courts to disregard it. Yoo, supra note 65,
at 757-58. The presumptions against extraterritoriality and violation of international
law are merely presumptions, and are clearly overcome in this case. Accordingly,
leaving aside potential constitutional objections, I would expect courts to apply the
Helms-Burton legislation fully, if cases under it were to come before them. Ramsey,
International Comity, supra note 1, at 906-31. On the other hand, I think it
inappropriate for courts to go out of their way to create this sort of jurisdictional
overreach, where Congress did not clearly intend it. Cf. Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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C. The Problem of State Foreign Policy
A third problem for advocates of an expansive ATCA is the idea
that the United States must speak with "one voice" in foreign affairs.
There is, for example, broad academic, political and judicial hostility
to the participation of state and local jurisdictions in matters affecting
U.S. foreign policy.73 Recent legislation in Massachusetts, for
example, imposed penalties upon companies doing business in
Burma, in response to the poor human rights record of the Burmese
military government.74 This and similar legislation are commonly
thought to pose practical and perhaps constitutional problems, for
permitting states and local jurisdictions to set themselves up as
independent foreign policy centers could fatally undermine the
authority of Congress and the President to establish the nation's
foreign policy.75
The debate on these matters is by no means one-sided, as a
number of writers-including the present author-have argued that
concerns over state and local foreign policy are overstated. 6
Remarkably, however, leading advocates of an expanded view of the
73. See, e.g., HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 35, at 151-65 (describing
general view); Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 832-33 (1989) (describing "consensus" view that "the central
government alone may directly exercise power in foreign affairs"); Bradford R.
Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245,
1295-97 (1996) (noting the Constitution appears to preclude the states from
exercising direct authority over foreign relations); Howard N. Fenton, III, The
Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade
Restrictions, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 563 (1993); Daniel M. Price & John P.
Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 443 (1998); David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of
State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma
(Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 175 (1997).
74. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000) (invalidating
the Massachusetts law on grounds of statutory preemption).
75. Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223
(1999). The First Circuit invalidated Massachusetts' Burma legislation on the
ground, among others, that it unconstitutionally interfered with the federal
government's voice in foreign affairs. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181
F.3d 38, 44 (1998), affd sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363 (2000). The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, finding that a
congressional statute preempted the Massachusetts law. In so doing, the Court
emphasized the practical problems with state foreign policies.
76. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 27; Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the
States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999) [hereinafter Power of the States in Foreign
Affairs].
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ATCA firmly take the position that foreign affairs are an exclusively
national matter in which states cannot have a "voice. '
Yet the perceived difficulties with state foreign policy activity
seem closely replicated in foreign policy activity by the federal courts
under the ATCA. First, the two may often be directed toward similar
ends. For example, concurrently with the Massachusetts Burma law,
suits were brought under the ATCA against Burma and Unocal, a
corporation with investments in Burma, for human rights violations."
Whether Unocal and other companies with Burmese investments are
deterred from operating in Burma due to Massachusetts' and other
states' legislation or because of litigation costs imposed by the federal
courts, the result is that investment in Burma is deterred in a way not
anticipated or directed by Congress or the President.79
In addition, the practical arguments raised against state
participation in foreign policy similarly apply to federal courts. The
principal concerns are that states have narrow parochial interests; that
they are unable to appreciate the implications of their actions on
national foreign policy interests; that they lack the expertise,
knowledge and geostrategic sophistication necessary to formulate
foreign policy; and that their participation renders weak and
inflexible the policies that may be formulated by Congress and the
President.' Yet essentially all of these points may be made with
respect to federal courts. Courts, like local jurisdictions, lack the
expertise, information and geostrategic experience needed to make
foreign policy. Just as states are unable to look beyond local interests
to see the "entire picture" of national foreign policy, courts have
77. Koh, supra note 43; Stephens, supra note 43; Neuman, supra note 43. In part,
this relates again to the jurisdictional problem under the ATCA. As noted, the
leading theory of federal jurisdiction in ATCA cases is that international law is
incorporated into federal common law, thus creating a federal question in all ATCA
cases. Henkin, International Law, supra note 15. The proposition that foreign affairs
are uniquely national affairs supports the authority of federal courts to create federal
common law in foreign affairs. Clark, supra note 73, at 1295-97. This in turn supports
the power of the federal courts to incorporate international law into federal common
law in ATCA cases. Koh, supra note 43; Stephens, supra note 43; Neuman, supra
note 43.
78. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). See Danielle
Everett, Comment, New Concern for Transnational Corporations: Potential Liability
for Tortious Acts Committed by Foreign Partners, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1123 (1998)
(discussing Unocal and its implications).
79. Crosby, 530 U.S. 363 (emphasizing need for President to control Burma
policy).
80. Spiro, supra note 75, at 123-34.
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difficulty looking beyond the particular case before them to
appreciate the full foreign policy context.
Finally, court-driven foreign policy may weaken and constrain
executive and congressional policy making. For example, the
Supreme Court, in invalidating Massachusetts' Burma law,
emphasized that foreign affairs often require a flexible, adaptable
response: it may be appropriate to press sanctions at one point, and
then quickly reverse course in response to perceived improvements in
the disposition of the foreign government.' The Court pointed out
that Congress had, with respect to Burma, given the President the
broad discretion needed to achieve such flexibility; but the presence
of competing state regimes of foreign policy would undermine that
goal, as the state policies could not change quickly and might run
exactly counter to the President's position.' All of this is true of
courts as well: in the Unocal case, for example, the court could hardly
allow or disallow the litigation on a flexible basis subject to on-going
evaluation based on the attitudes of the executive branch and the
Burmese government. Rather, the court's position-even more than
Massachusetts'-required a single, inflexible disposition unresponsive
to any evolution in the U.S.-Burma relationship.
Because I find the constitutional problems with state foreign
policy to be overstated,' 4 I do not think the analogy between court-
driven foreign policy and state-driven foreign policy is decisive
against the ATCA. The analogy remains striking, however, for two
reasons. First, as noted, many leading proponents of the ATCA and
of the international law community in general are strong opponents
of state foreign policy, and I think it fair to say that the weight of
conventional wisdom rests with the metaphor of the "one voice" in
foreign affairs. Yet those who accept this mantra when applied
against the states will have great difficulty, I think, in explaining why
parallel considerations do not apply against the ATCA. Second,
while the role of the states in foreign policy may be debated, even the
most committed defender of the states would not suggest that the
states should act incautiously in pursuing foreign policy objectives.
Rather, even if constitutionally authorized, states should proceed
81. Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 1643-63; Yoo, supra note 65, at 764-75.
82. Crosby, 530 U.S. 363.
83. Id.
84. Ramsey, Power of the States in Foreign Affairs, supra note 76, at 370-89;
Ramsey, Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, supra note 51, at 441-42;
see also Goldsmith, supra note 27, at 1663.
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carefully, in full awareness of the very substantial institutional
limitations upon their ability to act for good in foreign affairs. No less
should be said of the federal courts.
Conclusion
In sum, these observations are intended as cautionary, rather
than hostile, toward multinational corporate liability under the
ATCA. They do not suggest outright abandonment of the enterprise.
However, they do pose what I view as three difficult challenges for
advocates of an expansive ATCA, namely: (1) to explain how such an
enterprise is consistent with the underlying policy motivations of
Sabbatino, that separation of powers concerns militate against court
involvement in foreign affairs; (2) to explain how such an enterprise is
consistent with the near-unanimous academic rejection of the Helms-
Burton litigation, which appears to seek a remedy for property crimes
similar to that which the expanded ATCA seeks for human rights
abuses; and (3) to explain how such an enterprise is consistent with
the suspicion of multicentered foreign policymaking by state and local
governments, given that an expansive ATCA would devolve foreign
policymaking authority upon a multiplicity of local district judges and
appellate judges.'
In light of these difficult questions, it seems wise to proceed
cautiously in expanding the ATCA to matters not obviously within its
drafters' contemplation.' In particular, the foregoing concerns
suggest three structural limitations on ATCA cases. First, in light of
Sabbatino, courts should be particularly cautious in examining claims
that challenge overt and official policies of foreign nations, as
opposed to those involving essentially individual incidents.' Second,
in light of concerns about extraterritoriality, courts should be cautious
about examining claims based on events having no connection to the
85. On the latter point, see Yoo, supra note 65, at 774 (noting that judicial
policymaking in foreign affairs involves numerous largely independent decisions by
largely autonomous individual judges).
86. Rogers, supra note 52, at 50-52 (arguing that the principal targets of the
ATCA's drafters were individual acts-such as assaults on diplomats-occurring in
U.S. territory and for which the United States would be answerable under
international law).
87. Supra Part III.A; see, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88
(2d Cir. 2000) (considering claim arising from overt and avowed policy decision of
Nigerian government); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(considering claim broadly challenging economic development strategy of Burmese
government).
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United States, particularly where neither the defendant nor the
plaintiff are U.S. citizens.' Third, in light of concerns over
multifarious and conflicting foreign policies, courts should be cautious
about accepting ATCA claims that implicate debatable questions of
foreign policy, as opposed to those that involve matters of no great
foreign policy impact.' Put affirmatively, judges should be most
receptive to ATCA claims that involve at their core individual rather
than national transgressions, that involve persons and events with
strong ties to the United States, and that involve ordinary rather than
contentious theories of liability. To be sure, such caution may
deprive the ATCA of much of its headline-grabbing potential, but it
will also reduce much of its risk for foreign policy mischief."
88. Supra Part III.B. Compare Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (considering claim
against U.S. corporation where some acts allegedly occurred in the United States)
with Wiwa, 226 F.3d 88 (considering claim against non-U.S. corporations where all
relevant acts occurred outside the United States).
89. Supra Part III.C. Compare Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
(considering claim arising from an isolated act by a minor Paraguayan official not
necessarily part of formal government policy) and Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844
(11th Cir. 1996) (same for Ethiopian official) with Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880
(considering claim based on corporate cooperation with Burmese government, in
context of evolving U.S. foreign policy toward U.S. investment in Burma).
90. I reiterate that the ultimate basis for judicial caution is the lack of a clear
statutory mandate. In cases where the statutory mandate is clear, courts should
proceed despite apparent foreign policy effects, for in such cases Congress has made
the decision that the benefits of judicial involvement outweigh the disadvantages.
See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (providing an explicit cause of action for victims of international state-
sponsored torture). Under the ATCA, however, it is difficult to say that Congress
has engaged in such a weighing. Thus, the problem with an expansive view of the
ATCA is not that courts would transgress traditional concerns over separation of
powers and extraterritoriality, but that they would do so without explicit legislative
direction.
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